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Governance and water security: The role of the water institutional framework in 
the 2013-15 water crisis in São Paulo, Brazil  
 
Abstract 
Between 2013 and 2015, São Paulo experienced a major drought.  With drinking 
water reservoirs reduced to 5% of their capacity, the water supply company, 
SABESP, implemented measures to reduce household water consumption, while the 
Government of São Paulo State overruled watershed committees to prioritize the 
supply of water to SABESP.  While attention centered on freak meteorological 
conditions, the management of water resources and water services also played a 
role; in particular the conversion of SABESP from a state company to a mixed capital 
company in which the State Government held a majority stake.  As the crisis abated, 
the State Government announced measures to increase ‘water security’, comprising 
water diversion infrastructure to increase supply alongside governance reforms to 
improve state-led responses.  This paper examines the relationship between water 
security and water governance in the context of the São Paulo water crisis.  Most 
literature that analyses the governance dimensions of water security focuses on the 
principles of “good governance”, including decentralization, transparency, and 
participation, which not only neglects that these can function instrumentally, but also 
risks ignoring the structure and scaling of the water institutional landscape within 
which governance takes place.  We thus demonstrate how processes and structures 
that are broadly characteristic of “good governance” both exacerbated the effects of 
the drought and constrained responses to it.  We make two related arguments.  First, 
the mutually-beneficial commercial relationship between the state government and 
SABESP was fundamental in shaping these dynamics.  Second, the drought 
experience, shaped by these dynamics, has legitimized a shift back towards a 
centralized, top-down and supply-led approach to water.  This is discursively framed 
as envisaging future ‘water security’, yet serves to enhance SABESP’s revenue 
streams, and consequently State Government finances.  We thus suggest that the 
conventional view that good governance is conducive to water security needs to be 
reevaluated.  
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1.  Introduction 
In early 2015, the world watched as a water crisis unfolded in São Paulo, South 
America’s largest city.  Usually associated with arid north-eastern Brazil, following 
three dry (southern hemisphere) summers of 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15, south-
eastern Brazil experienced its “worst drought on record”1 (Braga and Kelman, 2016; 
Coelho et al., 2016).  Television broadcasts and newspaper articles showed the 
water level of the major Cantareira reservoir so low that abandoned cars were 
uncovered, as it drew down its usually untouched reserve  - its “dead volume” 
(Jacobi et al., 2015; Martirani and Peres, 2016).  Meanwhile, the Governor of São 
Paulo State, together with the CEO of the São Paulo State Water and Sanitation 
Company (SABESP), assured citizens that the city would not run out of water.  
São Paulo Metropolitan Region (SPMR) is the largest conurbation in South America 
(approximately 1500 km2), located in São Paulo State. The metropolitan region has 
approximately a population of 21 million residents across 39 municipalities, including 
São Paulo Municipality, which contains the city centre and financial district.  The city 
extends across the Upper Tietê watershed. Its water serves domestic (55%) and 
industrial (6%) uses (CBHAT, 2016), but is insufficient to fulfill the city’s water 
requirements.2  Thus, most of the city’s water is drawn from the Piracicaba-Capivari-
Jundiaí (PCJ) watershed beyond the city, which supplies the Cantareira system, 
serving 9 million people (Figure 1).   
Figure 1: São Paulo Metropolitan Region water system (Momm-Schult et al. 2015).  
Despite the State Governor’s assurances that the situation was under control – 
perhaps unsurprising in the midst of his re-election campaign – the city’s residents 
and businesses became accustomed to water shortages from 2014 onwards.  The 
State Government and SABESP, the state-wide utility providing water and sewerage 
in most municipalities, implemented measures aimed at alleviating the effects.  At the 
household level, these included a discount on water bills for below-average water 
consumption (10% discount for 10-15% saving, 20% for 15-20% saving, 30% for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 https://www.waterscarcitysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Emergency-measures-
in-response-to-drought-crisis.pdf.  
2 Water and sanitation coverage are 98.4% and 81.2%, respectively. 
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>20% saving, from February 2014),3 and well as a surcharge for above-average 
consumption (40% surcharge for ≤20% excess, 100% for >20% excess, from 
January 2015) (Braga and Kelman, 2016).4  City-wide measures comprised lowering 
water pressure across the system plus further reductions in pressure on a daily 
basis, alongside de-facto rationing of water by periodically turning off trunk stopcocks 
(Cohen, 2016).5  These measures were contentious as they were allegedly targeted 
at poorer areas, mostly on the city’s periphery, and disproportionately affected lower-
income households that were less likely to own storage tanks (Cohen, 2016), even if 
such communities were partially blamed for the crisis due to the prevalence of illegal 
water connections (Braga and Kelman, 2016).6  Beyond these measures, water 
users responded with their own solutions, including drilling wells (groundwater 
permits were not required during the drought) and purchasing water from tankers.  
Smaller-scale users also invested in storage tanks and rainwater cisterns where 
possible.   
During the crisis, attention was strongly focused on the freak meteorological 
conditions, and this discourse is reiterated in some accounts (Braga and Kelman, 
2016; Otto et al., 2015).  Yet, the historic management of water resources and water 
services in the city exacerbated the effects of the drought (Cohen, 2016): aside from 
lack of preparedness (Kuss, 2017), changes to the watershed conservation law that 
reduced the protection of water sources, the low levels of sewage treatment that 
contaminated major reservoirs (Budds et al., 2005), the failure to control pollution 
from industrial areas that rendered potential sources unviable,7 and the conversion of 
SABESP from a state company to a mixed capital company operating in accordance 
with commercial principles, which disincentivized investment in infrastructure repair 
and expansion.8     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 São Paulo state sanitation and energy regulatory agency – ARSESP. Deliberation 514, 22 
October 2014. http://www.arsesp.sp.gov.br/LegislacaoArquivos/ldl5142014.pdf 
4 São Paulo state sanitation and energy regulatory agency – ARSESP. Deliberation 545, 7 
January 2015. http://www.arsesp.sp.gov.br/LegislacaoArquivos/ldl5452015.pdf 
5 Personal communication, trade union representative, São Paulo, 18 February 2016.  
6 Jordana Timerman, ‘No one’s quite sure how São Paulo will survive its drought’, Citylab, 5 
February 2015. https://www.citylab.com/environment/2015/02/no-one-is-quite-sure-how-sao-
paulo-will-survive-its-drought/385211/ 
7 Personal communication, former state government official, São Paulo, 19 November 2015.  
8 A mixed company mode of privatisation, under which the State Government had a majority 
(50.3%) stake, was adopted instead of awarding a concession contract.   
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In late 2015, the rain returned.  Federal and State government agencies started to 
plan longer-term responses to improve “water security” in both São Paulo and Brazil 
more widely, which comprised infrastructure improvements alongside governance 
reforms (ANA, 2017).  This plan reflects conventional “water security” interventions: 
maintaining sufficient water over the longer term to reduce deficiencies and risks 
(Grey and Sadoff, 2007).  This emphasis on guaranteeing water directs responses 
towards infrastructure, which not only represents a (return to) a supply-led approach 
(Bakker, 2003), but also raises questions as to the extent to which such solutions are 
likely to simply address the symptoms of the crisis, as opposed to their causes, 
which may require challenging existing structures, practices, and interests.  
Governance, referring to the structures, processes, modes, and dynamics of 
decision-making around water, can play an important role in both producing water 
insecurity (Loftus, 2015) and fostering water security (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013).   
It is this interplay between water security and water governance that we address in 
this paper.  On the one hand, most literature that analyses the governance 
dimensions of water security focuses on the principles of “good governance,” 
including decentralization, transparency, and participation, but which can function 
instrumentally where they are centered around the provision of water, as opposed to 
the nature of water-society relations.  On the other hand, focusing on these principles 
and practices risks neglecting the nature, structure, and scaling of the wider 
institutional landscape within which water governance takes place.   
The aim of the paper is thus to examine the relationship between water security and 
water governance in the context of the 2013-15 water crisis in the São Paulo 
Metropolitan Region.  We will thus explore the role of governance processes and 
structures in shaping both the effects of the drought as well as responses to it.  We 
consider the historical development of the water institutional landscape, including the 
incorporation of supposedly progressive principles such as participation and 
decentralization, and the role of the public-private partnership between SABESP and 
the State Government.  Our analysis suggests that the effects of, and responses to, 
the drought were constrained by the institutional framework; but that the drought 
experience, largely framed as natural, has legitimized a water security strategy that 
returns to a centralized, top-down and supply-led approach to water, which serves 
the mutually-beneficial financial relationship between SABESP and the State 
Government.   
	   6	  
The study is based on an extensive desk review of published literature in both 
English and Portuguese conducted between 2014 and 2018, as well as a review of 
policy documentation and legislation, and examination of secondary datasets.  Data 
were also collected from a set of semi-structured key informant interviews conducted 
with representatives from government, civil society and the private sector in São 
Paulo between 2014 and 2017, and complemented by information and observations 
collected during attendance at selected public water-related events in São Paulo in 
2015 and 2016.   
Following this introduction, Section 2 reviews debates around water governance 
within the water security literature, and outlines a conceptual framework for the 
analysis based on critical water research.  Section 3 outlines the historical evolution 
of the water institutional arrangements and governance processes in São Paulo, in 
order to contextualize the nature, structure and scaling of the current framework.  
Section 4 then explores the role and influence of the water resources and water 
services governance frameworks in shaping decision-making during the crisis and 
solutions to the drought.  In section 5 we discuss the findings, in order to evaluate the 
relationship between water governance and water security, before drawing 
conclusions in section 6.  
 
2. Governance for water security 
The concept of water security has become increasingly influential in both water policy 
and scholarship, in response to the water-related deficiencies and risks that 
constitute the “global water crisis” (Bakker, 2012; Bogardi et al., 2012).  Yet, as Cook 
and Bakker (2012) note, the term is both multiple and malleable: on the one hand, it 
relates to a wide range of water issues, from water availability to water-related 
hazards; while, on the other, it lacks specificity, being applied to multiple scales (from 
household to nation-state), with little direction as to how it should be achieved.   
Jepson et al. (2017:47) argue that the conceptualization of water security as long-
term water sufficiency “identifies water as a predominantly material object (‘H2O’) that 
needs to be ‘secured,’ a view that points towards interventions to capture water to 
alleviate or address situations where it is deficient or scarce,” because it disregards 
the social relations that configure access to water as well as those that advance 
human flourishing as part of society-water relations (Loftus, 2015; Swyngedouw, 
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2013).  These authors, therefore, argue that water security should not be seen as a 
goal, but rather as “a relationship that describes how individuals, households, and 
communities navigate and transform hydro-social relations to access the water that 
they need and in ways that support the sustained development of human capabilities 
and wellbeing in their full breadth and scope” (Jepson et al., 2017:50).  Transforming 
hydro-social relations to pursue water security implies enabling people and 
organizations to meaningfully engage in water governance not just as water users 
but also as political actors.   
Indeed, governance is an increasingly important theme within the water security 
literature.  Water governance is defined by Bakker and Morinville (2013:1) as “the 
range of political, organizational and administrative processes through which 
community interests are articulated, their input is incorporated, decisions are made 
and implemented, and decision-makers are held accountable in the development and 
management of water resources and delivery of water services”.  Cook and Bakker 
(2012) argue that the emergence of water security is positive because it emphasizes 
the need for water governance, to counter more technocratic approaches to water 
management (e.g. Integrated Water Resources Management), and so “good water 
governance is necessary to move towards water security at an operational level” 
(ibid.:100).   
Most water security literature that addresses governance refers to ‘good 
governance’: ‘‘participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of 
law’’ (UNESCAP, 2011, cited in Cook and Bakker, 2012).  Grey and Sadoff (2007) 
present governance as necessary to support water security for economic growth: 
strong economic growth fosters effective water management, which leads to good 
governance, which results in more investment in water infrastructure and institutions, 
and which facilitates economic growth, and so on.  Bogardi et al. (2012) advocate 
better principles of governance, including access to information and stakeholder 
participation, as well as new modalities of governance, especially polycentric 
governance (involving multiple stakeholders) and adaptive governance (flexible vis-à-
vis uncertainty and complexity).  They regard these as key mechanisms to achieve 
“consensus solutions […] achieved by evidence-based mediation” (ibid.:35).  
Similarly, Pahl-Wostl et al. (2013) promote shared decision-making, social learning, 
(independently) facilitated negotiation, participation, transparency, information 
sharing, and decentralization to overcome lack of political will, ineffective 
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jurisdictions, weak formal institutions, asymmetric power structures, and lobbying by 
special interest groups.   
Yet, in these accounts, good governance tends to be treated vaguely, descriptively, 
normatively, and homogenously.  Governance modalities and principles are 
presented with little practical detail or consideration of impediments: legal 
frameworks need effective enforcement, access to information is meaningless if 
stakeholders cannot read or interpret it, and participation can depend on resources, 
education, gender, and social status (Budds, 2009; Empinotti, 2010).  They are 
presented as generalized ideals with little reference to context specificity (Bakker and 
Morinville, 2013; Himley, 2008).  Overall, therefore, there is little acknowledgement in 
these analyses of how power relations and politics can both contribute to water 
insecurity (Loftus, 2015), as well as shape key elements of governance to support 
water security.  For example, Bakker and Morinville (2013) accept that social learning 
holds potential to include non-traditional actors who may produce new ideas and/or 
challenge existing practice, yet question whether this is realistic in contexts where 
such actors (e.g. indigenous leaders) often lack the necessary social status to exert 
influence, and/or where existing practices are deeply embedded in existing power 
structures (e.g. caste) or tied to large-scale capital accumulation (e.g. mining).9   
These authors, therefore, refute the “view of governance as a (straightforward) 
‘recipe’” for water security (ibid.:11). 
Power relations do not only influence governance around water security directly, as 
described above, but also extend to the political work that water security can effect 
(Bridge, 2015; Cook and Bakker, 2012).  While most analyses of governance for 
water security focus on formal and higher-level institutional arrangements, studies 
that have examined micro-level and informal decision-making demonstrate how 
water security interventions can shift state-society relations, which are almost entirely 
unquestioned in the water security literature.  For instance, Vandewalle and Jepson’s 
(2015) study of the implementation of water treatment technologies in low-income 
and unserved Hispanic households in Texas showed that these did not just offer 
stop-gap solutions to precarious supply, but rather reinforced individual and private 
responsibility for solutions, thereby reducing pressure on collective or political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 They also assert that social power can be conducive to water security, as demonstrated by 
Ostrom’s studies of cooperation and collective action in managing common-pool resources.  
However, it is not clear how social power in relatively homogenous contexts (of autonomous 
and/or indigenous villages) can be extended to situations where power differentials and 
economic interests are more significant.   
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interventions.  In this way, the role of governance can be understood as not just 
making rules for water security, but also achieving rule through water security (Bridge 
and Perreault 2009; Himley 2008; Lemos and Agrawal 2006).   
Returning to the framework proposed by Jepson et al. (2017), this advocates a shift 
in the focus of water security interventions away from the supply of water and 
towards the nature of water-society relations (see also Linton, 2012).  In relation to 
governance, this implies a need to complement an analysis of decision-making 
frameworks and processes for water security interventions, with attention to how 
those interventions interact with existing social structures and orders at different 
scales (Linton and Budds, 2014).  The formation of new organizations, spaces and 
scales for water governance is often presented as a pragmatic policy endeavor, yet 
may serve as a means through which to stabilize existing status quos that reflect 
unequal power relations (Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Norman et al., 2014).  For 
example, contrary to dominant discourse, Norman and Bakker (2009) observed that 
decentralization did not necessarily either reduce the role of the national state or 
increase decision-making power at the local level.  Similarly, Warner (2007) identified 
a lack of both decision-making authority as well as power-sharing within multi-
stakeholder platforms at the watershed level.  While rescaling governance to the 
watershed level reflects a popular policy response, Cohen and Davidson (2011) 
identified the potential for creating overlapping and conflictive governance tools and 
processes, while Budds and Hinojosa (2012) argued that this change could 
potentially enhance the power of dominant groups of water users at the expense of 
others.  
We now turn to the case study of São Paulo, in which we will examine how the water 
governance framework has evolved, in order to understand how it shaped responses 
to the drought, and decision-making during the crisis, and with what effects.   
 
3. The evolution of water governance in the São Paulo Metropolitan 
Region 
Unlike other countries, the Brazilian federal system operates according to a 
hierarchical system of legislation that defines access to natural resources.  In the 
case of water, two laws - the Water Law and the Sanitation Law – set out the 
management systems, policies, and fees, for water resources and water and 
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sanitation services, respectively.  This combination of these two laws and their 
institutional arrangements shapes water governance practices; hence, to understand 
how water access and distribution is organized in São Paulo and its metropolitan 
region, it is important to understand existing legal and institutional structures as well 
as how they have been shaped for this specific context over time. 
In Brazil, water access has been historically organized by the government, which has 
responded to demand for different uses in a centralized manner.  While bulk water 
allocation is controlled by the federal government, the institutional arrangements for 
water supply (and sanitation) fall within the remit of the state and municipal 
governments.  Over the last century, water services in the SPMR have been 
influenced primarily by legal and management changes.  These have led to water 
and sanitation changing from private to public management, and then from public to 
private-public, and to governance being rescaled from the municipal, to the regional, 
and then to the state level (Figure 2).  These influences, and the changes they 
brought, have forged the water institutional landscape that exists today, and which is 
important in understanding how water governance has evolved in this particular way. 
Figure 2: Water access and distribution in the SPMR: Institutional arrangements over 
time  
In the nineteenth century, urban water supply water was provided by private 
companies in Brazil (Aversa and Oliveira, 2017).  However, by the 1930s, the need 
to expand infrastructure to support the country’s industrialization fostered the 
creation of a state-level autarchy responsible for managing and supplying water to 
the SPMR, the future industrial center of the country.  Under this institutional design, 
state-level agencies were responsible for providing bulk water to local municipal 
agencies that, in turn, would be responsible for distributing water to households 
(Aversa and Oliveira, 2017).  However, due to São Paulo’s growing political and 
economic importance, it was the state-level autarchy that became responsible for 
supplying water to São Paulo municipality, thereby shifting control over water from 
the local to the state level for the first time.  
In the 1970s, the state government consolidated its control over water supply in the 
SPMR in response to the new Water Supply Plan (PLANASA).  Designed by the 
federal government during the dictatorship, PLANASA institutionalized the hydraulic 
mission for water supply in order to serve growing demand for water in the now large 
urban and heavily industrialized SPMR.  This approach gave rise to the construction 
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of the Cantareira reservoir system in the 1970s.  Comprising a complex network of 
canals and pumping stations that diverts 31 cubic meters of water per second from 
tributaries of the Piracicaba River, the system is responsible for providing water to 
the population of São Paulo, about 100 miles to the southeast (Abers and Keck, 
2013).  The installation of such a complex system was key in influencing the 
decision-making processes with regard to the SPMR.  
At the same time, PLANASA centralized the water supply management system and 
its financing at the federal level, and created state-level agencies to coordinate and 
provide water services.  This institutional reform thus constituted a top-down reform 
that replaced the previous municipal autonomy over water supply.  As a result, many 
of the 39 municipalities in the SPMR transferred their water supply to the newly-
created state-level company, SABESP.  This structural shift had profound 
implications for water governance.  It meant that SABESP not only had privileged 
access to federal public investment and incentives through PLANASA, but it also 
controlled the Cantareira water system that supplied the municipal agencies with bulk 
water, and alongside it, that is, both the infrastructure and the water permit.  In 
addition, it assumed water distribution for most municipalities in the state, including 
São Paulo, which simultaneously overpowered and weakened the existing municipal 
and metropolitan water supply agencies (Aversa and Oliveira, 2017).   
In the 1990s, tensions between state and municipal level water agencies reached a 
climax due to the implementation of neoliberal reforms.  These tensions stemmed 
from two related factors: the push to privatize water and sanitation services under the 
discourse of promoting greater efficiency and accountability; and the proposed 
continued centralization of water supply services at the state level (Aversa and 
Oliveira, 2017; Heller and Rezende, 2008; Murtha et al., 2015).  It was as part of 
these reforms, which included the 1995 Concession Law (8987), that SABESP was 
converted from a public company into a publicly traded mixed capital company in 
1997 by floating shares on the São Paulo stock market (BM&FBOVESP) (Aversa 
and Oliveira, 2017; Heller et al., 2014).  The state government held a majority stake 
(50.3%).  However, despite this change, bulk water allocation was still controlled by 
federal and state level government agencies, although the decision-making 
structures around them were about to change. 
Two new laws were subsequently approved by Congress: the 1997 Water Law 
(9433) and the 2007 Sanitation Law (11485), which changed the nature of water 
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access and allocation.  These two pieces of legislation institutionalized formal 
governance practices into Brazil’s water management system.   
The 1997 Water Law introduced watershed committees and councils, which 
comprised representatives of civil society organizations, water users, and municipal, 
state, and federal government agencies, who were responsible for drawing up water 
and sanitation plans that would guide state development (Abers and Keck, 2013).  
Such changes affected bulk water allocation, a key link between the water resources 
and water services institutional frameworks (Figure 3).  Henceforth, bulk water 
allocation permits would be issued not by the federal government, but rather in 
accordance with the recommendations of the watershed plan, which defined how 
much water should be distributed to each sector.  For example, the Alto Tietê 
watershed plan established water supply as its priority use, since its area is heavily 
populated and demand would not be fully met, and thus the bulk water allocation 
permits were mainly designated to water supply.  Therefore, government agencies 
no longer decided the allocation of water rights, and instead had to follow the 
watershed plans. 
Figure 3: Interdependence between the Water Resources and Water Services 
governance systems (own elaboration)  
The two new laws also changed the role and influence of stakeholders in water 
decision-making processes, thus expanding governance beyond the state and 
forcing technocrats to dialogue with representatives from other social sectors.  In the 
SPMR, this process thus encompassed a new set of stakeholders who had the ability 
to shape water resources and water supply systems and their governance practices, 
including the state government’s Water and Electrical Energy Department (DAEE), 
municipalities (represented by their mayors), water supply companies, the Industrial 
Federation, the Agriculture Federation, and a range of civil society organizations.  
The 2007 Sanitation Law regulated the types of companies allowed to supply water 
to municipalities, which effectively enabled SABESP to become the main water 
service supplier across São Paulo state.  As a mixed capital company, SABESP 
continued to enjoy the advantages of public support, including access to federal 
public resources and funds, without having to fulfill the obligations that could have 
compromised interests, such as transparency.  This meant that the company was 
protected from risk by being able to keep liabilities off its books, while simultaneously 
being able to conceal relationships between shareholding companies (Heller et al., 
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2014).  Thus, in effect, the Sanitation Law enabled a new institutional modality that 
operated under market conditions as a private entity (i.e. maximizing the 
shareholders’ return), while reaping the benefits of a public agency (e.g. benefiting 
from access to public resources and the monopolization of water supply services at 
the local level).  It is to the implications of this new public-private institutional modality 
for the drought and its responses that we now turn.  
 
4. The role and influence of governance on the 2013-15 drought in São 
Paulo  
During the 2013-15 drought, the main reservoir system supplying water to the SPMR, 
the Cantareira system, was the most affected, dropping to 5% of its capacity by 
September 2014 (Artigo 19, 2014).  In theory, the governance systems for the 
management of water resources and water and sanitation services established the 
processes and responsibilities for deciding how to manage access to water under 
this situation.  However, the governor of São Paulo state together with 
representatives from key state-level agencies – including SABESP - took control of 
the major decisions and coordinated their actions in order to supply water to São 
Paulo municipality as the first priority, and to the rest of the metropolitan region (38 
municipalities) as the second, thereby superseding the formal decision-making 
processes in place.  Yet, how did this come about? 
In the case of drought, the first action that would usually be taken would be to adjust 
water allocation permits in order to prioritize water supply over other uses.  According 
to the Water Law, in critical periods water should be used to meet people’s basic 
needs (Hídricos, 2002).  Since the water supply system for the SPMR depends on a 
water transfer from a different watershed that lies beyond its boundaries - the 
Piracicaba, Capivari and Jundiaí (PCJ) Watershed (Figure 1), - the water allocation 
negotiation should involve not just the Upper Tietê Watershed committee but also 
that of the PCJ.  In addition, the National Water Agency (ANA) should be involved, 
since water transfers and bulk water allocation fall under its responsibility.  In parallel, 
the Sanitation Law establishes that SABESP should produce a contingency plan that 
defines how water distribution would be controlled under drought conditions.  
However, these mechanisms only come into force once a drought is officially 
declared, and this did not happen in São Paulo until August 2015, even though the 
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drought had started in 2013 and its effects were clearly being felt across the city from 
2014, as noted earlier (Artigo 19, 2016).  Until this point, both the state government 
and the federal government had avoided acknowledging that there was a water 
crisis, and designating it as a drought, for political reasons, because national 
(president) and state (governor) elections were both taking place in October 2014.  
This explains why some measures to address the drought, such as the discount for 
reduced consumption, and the surcharge for increased consumption, levied on 
household bills were only put in place in October 2014 and January 2015, 
respectively.  
Despite the failure to declare a drought, negotiations over water withdrawals took 
place within the Technical Assessment Group for the Management of the Cantareira 
Water System (GTAG), created in February 2014 by the National Water Agency 
(ANA) and the São Paulo State Government Department for Water and Energy 
(DAEE) under their legal attributions (ANA, 2014).  The CTAG comprises 
representatives from ANA, the São Paulo state government’s Department of Water 
and Electrical Energy (DAEE), SABESP, the PCJ and Upper Tietê Watershed 
committees, and has the goals of defining measures to be taken in order to 
guarantee water supply, as well as to monitor the quality and quantity of water in 
reservoirs and publish these data (ANA, 2014).  
The decisions taken by GTAG in response to the water crisis focused mainly on 
reducing water withdrawals from the Cantareira System.  By March 2014, ANA and 
DAEE started to reduce the amount of water withdrawn, and continued to do so over 
the following months.  The reductions were greater for the withdrawals to supply 
users in the PCJ watershed (25%) than they were for those in the Upper Tietê 
watershed (10%).  Neither the PCJ nor the Upper Tietê watershed committees raised 
objections to these reductions, but this may be because their participation was 
limited to technical boards, which mainly concentrated on monitoring precipitation 
and reservoir volumes, and proposing guidelines for saving water at the watershed 
level (CBHAT, 2016; Artigo 19, 2016).  
Given this role of the watershed committees, decisions became concentrated among 
federal and state-level agencies, including SABESP.  However, no clear plan 
emerged for water saving beyond the reductions in water withdrawals from the 
Cantareira system.  SABESP’s main response comprised the reduction of water 
pressure across the system in order to reduce leakage (Cohen, 2016).  This 
contributed to the emergence of two activist networks (Aliança pela Água and 
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Coletivo de Luta pela Água), who emerged as the main critical voices during the 
drought.  They worked with federal and state public prosecutors to demand 
information to understand the crisis, to challenge government reports and solutions, 
and to call for actions to guarantee access to water (Martirani and Peres, 2016).  
The situation was further compounded when, in September 2014, ANA announced 
that it would no longer participate in the GTAG because the São Paulo State 
Secretary of Sanitation and Water Resources was not fulfilling its commitments to 
reduce dependency on the Cantareira system and to comply with the reduction in 
water withdrawals (Artigo 19, 2014).  The GTAG was subsequently dissolved.  This 
meant that, thereafter, decisions and actions to respond to the water crisis were 
concentrated at the state level, through the governor of São Paulo state, state-level 
agencies, and SABESP.   
Once the state agencies were in control, and the elections were over, São Paulo 
state finally declared a drought in 2015.  The declaration enabled the implementation 
of drought measures, as above, but also allowed state agencies to procure 
public/private finance to implement solutions.  The solutions proposed by these state 
agencies reflected the traditional hydraulic paradigm - increasing water supply rather 
than reducing water demand - reframed as the pursuit of ‘water security’.  This 
comprised infrastructure expansion, including to interconnect the city’s main reservoir 
systems (including Cantareira) and to divert water from other watersheds (Artigo 19, 
2014; Cohen, 2016; CBHAT, 2016; Rocha, 2017).  In this way, the drought was 
framed as a problem of low precipitation and infrastructure capacity, as opposed to 
high levels of water demand, leakage, and pollution.  
Even though, in principle, the watershed committees are responsible for approving 
water infrastructure through the revision of watershed plans, these decisions were 
taken by state agencies in a top-down manner.10  Therefore, the negotiations and 
decisions to address the water crisis did not take place within the formal participatory 
governance system, but outside it, thus undermining the Water Law and its 
institutions.  In response to this autocratic recentralization of decision-making by 
state agencies, and its wider aim of pursuing a traditional hydraulic paradigm, the 
other stakeholders also stopped using the formal negotiation channels.  This meant 
that the judicial system became the only channel for interaction, as federal and state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Personal communication, state government official, São Paulo, 24 February 2016. 
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public prosecutors questioned the state-level agencies’ actions, to which these were 
obliged to respond.  
The strategy of the state governor and the state-level agencies, including SABESP, 
to pursue supply-led solutions, had the effect of protecting SABESP’s assets and 
thus its revenue stream.  On the one hand, SABESP’s interest in protecting its 
business led it to strongly defend its water withdrawals from the Cantareira system 
so as to be able to continue to supply its most profitable customer base in the SPMR 
(especially São Paulo municipality); at the expense of other municipalities in São 
Paulo state, such as Campinas and Itu, where water rationing was implemented.  On 
the other hand, maintaining this water supply was both crucial for the state 
governor’s election campaign, and also for maintaining the revenue stream to the 
government of São Paulo state through its majority shareholding.  This shared 
strategy is reflected in the adoption of a water security strategy that did not seek to 
manage or reduce demand for water, but rather sought water from other watersheds 
and proposed new hydraulic infrastructure, while ignoring polluted water sources, 
avoiding investment in sewage treatment, and ignoring measures for water 
conservation (Kuss, 2017).11  Importantly, this strategy required measures to 
preserve the supply-led water paradigm, and to override participatory governance 
mechanisms that potentially threatened it.  It was the drought that enabled this 
strategy to come into play, mobilized through a particular framing of water security as 
“water infrastructure security” (ANA, 2017) that required (re)centralized state control.  
  
5. Governance: the solution or the problem for water security?   
Rather than analyzing the water resources and water services systems separately, 
as is done in much literature on water in Brazil, we have examined both institutional 
arrangements as a single governance framework.  This allowed us to understand 
their interconnections as well as their functioning in the context of the 2013-15 
drought, and to interpret how the particular responses and outcomes were forged.  In 
particular, it enabled us to make sense of how an attempt to decentralize and to 
promote participatory institutions was not enough to reshape a centralized, 
technocratic and supply-led paradigm of water management, despite the introduction 
of stakeholders and spaces of negotiation as part of the governance system.  This, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Personal communication, civil society representative, São Paulo, 18 November 2015.  
	   17	  
we argue, is because the hydraulic paradigm served important vested interests that 
had also been consolidated through the restructuring of the governance system, 
especially the mutually beneficial commercial relationship between the state 
government and SABESP.  
For some authors, the absence of responses from formal participatory institutions to 
the water crisis can be explained by two factors: the lack of participation, 
transparency, and accountability – the principles of good governance - in the water 
governance system, as well as the lack of environmental justice (Jacobi et al., 2015; 
Fracalanza and Freire, 2015).  Others have suggested the absence of strategic 
planning and the use of scientific information to support decision-making processes 
(Cortez et al., 2015), alongside a suite of more general assertions around population 
pressure and water wastage (Braga and Kelman, 2016; Otto et al., 2015; Tundisi and 
Tundisi, 2015).  However, this and other literature has presented no discussion of the 
historical and structural factors shaping governance practices, which, in this case, 
allowed the São Paulo state governor as well as the state agencies and SABESP to 
control responses to the 2013-15 water crisis.   
We recognize that the encounter of old and new institutional arrangements 
engendered the governance practices in place, and created a structure that 
ultimately transcended, and discarded, the spaces of negotiation promoted by the 
Water Law and the Sanitation Law.  This suggests that water governance should not 
be seen as simply a matter of organizing decision-making around water in the 
interests of multiple stakeholders (cf. Braga and Kelman, 2016), but understood as 
an arena within which power relations play out; in this case subject to (re)domination 
in order to reassert control over a system that was crucial for certain political and 
economic ends (Bridge and Perreault, 2009).  Therefore, we would contend that it is 
not just the processes of governance that merit examination as part of water security 
analyses, or even simply the ways in which such processes are inflected by power 
relations, but also the structure and scaling of the institutional framework, which is 
both an effect of power and can constitute an instrument of power( Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001; Agarwal, 2001).  We are thus inclined to agree with Bakker and 
Morinville’s (2013) assertion that governance should not be seen as a simple ‘recipe’ 
for water security, and indeed would go further in questioning the commonly-held 
assumption that the principles of good governance are in themselves conductive to 
fostering water security.   
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As a result of our analysis, we have identified three main entry points that reveal how 
historically evolved structures and processes of governance shaped both decision-
making during the water crisis, and responses to the drought: (1) persisting sectoral 
approaches to water management that constrain water governance; (2) the 
(re)scaling of decision-making processes that result in unclear roles for stakeholders; 
and (3) the continued power asymmetries in governance frameworks, exacerbated 
by commercial relationships.  We now take each of these points in turn.   
First, the persisting sectoral organization of water within government in Brazil 
facilitated centralized state action to guarantee water security through infrastructure.  
This reflects a view of water management as merely a matter of defining flows from 
specific water bodies to specific regions.  Thus, the remit of the Water Law is to 
regulate access to surface water, but without any role in the infrastructure, allocation, 
or land use patterns that influence water availability, quality, and access, and without 
the authority to regulate specific water uses.  Furthermore, budgets for the 
mechanisms that guarantee water availability and allocation are divided between 
other sectors, such as energy, sanitation, agriculture, and transportation. Therefore, 
while the legislation seeks to coordinate water resources and uses, it continues to 
respond to different sectors and its control remains divided among different 
government agencies.  This maintenance of sectoral water management across 
government weakens the principles of participation and decentralization that are 
embedded in the Water Law, because critical decisions with regard to water 
allocation and investment in infrastructure are controlled by other sectors that 
maintain centralized and technocratic decision-making processes and can disregard 
the decisions and recommendations from watershed plans that are established by 
law (Empinotti et al., 2014).  
Second, the decentralization of the water governance framework transferred 
responsibility from the federal government to state and local governments, and from 
government ministries to autonomous public institutions, headed by ANA (Lemos and 
Oliveira, 2004).  At the same time, governance of water resources was rescaled to 
the basin level, which challenged the political boundaries of states and municipalities, 
and called for subnational and intergovernmental dialogue (Abers and Keck, 2013).  
This means that, in transboundary basins where the main river is under federal 
control, at least three different levels of government will be involved: federal, state, 
and watershed (Lemos and Oliveira, 2004).  However, decentralization did not 
extend decision-making to the local level given that there is a minimal role for 
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municipalities in the management of water resources (which are mainly managed at 
the state and federal levels); and that their main concern pertains to domestic water 
services, which, due to the evolution of the water services governance framework 
including under the Sanitation Law, are now predominantly provided by external 
water supply companies.12  Therefore, this particular scaling of water institutions in 
São Paulo state led to vacuums in responsibility in some instances, and overlapping 
functions in others.  This scenario led to the São Paulo state government and 
SABESP taking advantage of these deficits and positioning themselves as the main 
decision-makers, overriding both water committees and municipalities during the 
drought to reconcentrate decision-making power at the state level.  
Third, a critical factor in understanding the water crisis is how power asymmetries 
were constructed among stakeholders, and how the São Paulo state government 
dominated governance processes and spaces.  For example, the state government, 
through its political and financial power, controls mayors and state agencies, such as 
DAEE, which holds the presidency of the watershed committees.  The state governor 
also appoints the CEO of SABESP.  As SABESP is a mixed capital company with a 
majority stake owned by the state government, the state government is thus also 
able to control the water supply sector for the state while promoting its management 
in accordance with market principles.  This led to the state promoting commercial 
strategy for SABESP, protecting the company’s assets, guaranteeing its financial 
returns, and opening up new opportunities for investment (infrastructure), thereby 
privileging revenue generation over the fulfillment of basic water and sanitation 
needs for São Paulo’s population.  During the water crisis, the state government 
secured SABESP’s access to water withdrawals, and endorsed its response to adjust 
pricing rather than promote water conservation.  Moreover, this strategic commercial 
alliance between the state government and SABESP served to wield control over, 
and dismantle, participatory spaces of negotiation, that resulted in the judiciary 
becoming the main forum of interaction.  The outcome was thus not only the 
prevalence of a self-interested agenda, but the weakening of the governance system, 
in turn leading to a return to a centralized and technocratic mode of governance.  
In sum, while structures of decision-making shaped responses to the drought, the 
drought also reconfigured water governance arrangements.  In framing the drought 
as a deficit of precipitation and infrastructure, the state government was able to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In the SPMR, five municipal water services providers still exist, the majority of the rest 
having been taken over by SABESP (Aversa and Oliveira, 2017).  
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mobilize a traditional hydraulic paradigm to promote water security.  As we have 
argued above, this particular framing of water security benefited the state 
government’s political and economic interests, but it also serves to maintain the 
status quo in terms of securing the future supply of water while avoiding deeper 
structural reform.  This is reflected in the draft Water Law amendment bill (ANA, 
2017), which defines water security in terms of the supply of water to be achieved 
through water infrastructure on the one hand, and governance reforms on the other.  
This is not a progressive modality of governance that promotes democratic practices 
among multiple constituencies, but rather a technocratic one that seeks to centralize 
control and promote capital accumulation.  Therefore, the assumption that 
governance is necessarily conducive to water security needs to be reevaluated.  
 
6. Conclusion   
In March 2016, the governor of São Paulo announced the end of the drought (Artigo 
19, 2016).  Measures to avoid future crises included significant investment in water 
transfers from the Paraíba do Sul watershed to the PCJ watershed in order to feed 
the Cantareira system and guarantee water security for the SPMR (Braga and 
Kelman, 2016).  At the same time, SABESP reported an increase in profits of 15.4% 
by the end of 2015, as the result of the increased water tariff, and in 2016, the 
highest profit in the history of the company.13  The actions taken during the drought, 
combined with a cut in investment and a reduction in technical staff were responsible 
for these financial results.14   
The principal response by the federal government was the proposal of an 
amendment bill in which the main change was the political appropriation and 
mobilization of the term “water security”, defined simply as measures to supply water 
to where it is needed over the long term.  The proposal combines an emphasis on 
infrastructure solutions with the introduction of  a new council composed of federal 
representatives responsible for monitoring water security conditions and for 
proposing measures and investment to guarantee water availability under conditions 
of stress.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 http://www.redebrasilatual.com.br/economia/2015/08/em-meio-a-crise-de-abastecimento-
sabesp-aumenta-lucro-de-acionistas-em-11-5-6204.html 
14 https://www.istoedinheiro.com.br/vale-pena-investir-na-sabesp/ 
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In São Paulo, therefore, processes and structures that are broadly characteristic of 
“good governance” both exacerbated the effects of the drought and constrained 
responses to it.  The sectoral and fragmented structure of the water governance 
framework allowed for the perpetuation of state control, despite the existence of 
decentralized and participatory water institutions.  The mutually-beneficial 
commercial relationship between the State Government and SABESP was 
fundamental in shaping these dynamics, because it oriented both drought responses 
and governance strategies in directions that privileged revenue streams over basic 
needs.  Moreover, the drought experience, shaped by these dynamics, has 
legitimized a shift back towards a centralized, top-down and supply-led approach to 
water, discursively framed ‘water security’.  Water security thus became part of the 
governance structure that served to maintain existing power relations in place.  It 
legitimized infrastructure and governance fixes in order to perpetuate a centralized, 
and technocratic agenda in which state actors repositioned themselves as the main 
decision-makers, and which served to enhance the revenue of both SABESP and the 
state government.   
It is therefore not the presence, but the evolution and structure, of governance that is 
key to understanding these dynamics and their effects.  Simply focusing on the 
presence of governance disregards how power relations are unevenly distributed 
throughout decision-making structures, the presence of networks of control and 
influence, and the ways in which policies can reinforce non-egalitarian distribution of 
functions (Swyngedouw, 2009). The consequences of such structures can lead to 
autocracy, masked  by the production of artificial agendas that are presented as 
common and collaborative, but which serve hidden underlying motives.  In sum, 
structures of governance can promote inequality and power asymmetries just as they 
can promote progressive and democratic decision-making. 
This conclusion aligns with a post-political perspective, in which governance is 
understood as an assemblage of governing technologies fused around consensus, 
agreement, accountancy metrics, and technocratic environmental management, and 
which thus constitutes a technical fix like any other (Swyngedouw, 2005).  If we 
understand water security not simply about providing physical water but changing the 
social relations through which water is organized (Jepson et al., 2017), water 
governance for water security should follow suit.  We thus suggest that the 
conventional view that good governance is conducive to water security needs to be 
reevaluated.  
	   22	  
 
7. References 
Abers, R. N., Keck, M. E. 2013. Practical Authority: Agency and Institutional Change 
in Brazilian Water Politics. Oxford University Press: New York. 
Agarwal, B. 2001. Participatory Exclusions, Community Forestry, and Gender: An 
Analysis for South Asia and a Conceptual Framework. World Development 29(10), 
1623-1648. 
ANA, Agência Nacional de Águas, 2017. Projeto Legado. 
http://www2.ana.gov.br/Paginas/projetos/ProjetoLegado.aspx 
Artigo 19, 2014. Sistema Cantareira e a Crise da Água em São Paulo: a falta de 
transparência no acesso à informação. http://artigo19.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Relatório-Sistema-Cantareira-e-a-Crise-daÁgua-em-São-
Paulo-a-falta-de-transparência-no-acesso-à-informação.pdf 
Artigo 19, 2016. O Sistema Cantareira e a crise da água em São Paulo: falta de 
transparência, um problema que persiste. http://artigo19.org/wp-
content/blogs.dir/24/files/2016/06/Sistema-Cantareira-e-a-Crise-da-Água-em-São-
Paulo-2.pdf 
Aversa, M., Oliveira, V. E. de. 2017. Relações intergovernamentais e trajetórias 
dependents na implementação da Lei Nacional de Saneamento Básico na Região 
Metropolitana de São Paulo. Paper presented at the Encontro Nacional da 
Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Planejamento Urbano e 
Regional, São Paulo, SP. 
Bakker, K., 2003. An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatizing Water in England and 
Wales. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Bakker, K., 2012. Water security: research challenges and opportunities. Science  
337(6097), 914-915.  
Bakker, K., Morinville, C., 2013. The governance dimensions of water security: a 
review. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 371: 20130116 
Bogardi, J.J., et al. 2012. Water security for a planet under pressure: interconnected 
challenges of a changing world call for sustainable solutions. Current Opinion in 
	   23	  
Environmental Sustainability 4, 35-43.  
Braga, B., Kelman, G., 2016. Facing the challenge of extreme climate: The Case of 
Metropolitan São Paulo. Water Policy 18, 52-69.  
Bridge, G., 2015. Energy (in)security: world-making in an age of scarcity. The 
Geographical Journal 181(4), 328-356.  
Bridge, G., Perreault, T., 2009. Environmental governance. In: Castree, N., Demeritt, 
D., Liverman, D. (Eds.) Companion to Environmental Geography. Wiley-Blackwell: 
Oxford, pp. 475-497. 
Budds, J., Teixeira, P, 2005. Ensuring the right to the city: pro-poor housing, urban 
development and tenure legalization in São Paulo, Brazil. Environment and 
Urbanization 17 (1), 89-113. 
Budds, J., 2009. Contested H2O: science, policy and politics in water resources 
management in Chile. Geoforum 40(3): 418-430. 
Budds, J., Hinojosa, L., 2012. Restructuring and Rescalling Water Governance in 
Mining Contexts: The Co-Production of Waterscapes in Peru. Water Alternatives 
5(1), 119-137. 
CBHAT - Comitê de Bacia Hidrográfica do Alto Tietê, 2016. FABHAT - Fundação 
Agência Da Bacia Hidrográfica Do Alto Tietê. Relatório – I Plano de Bacia 
Hidrográfica do Alto Tietê - UGRHI 06 - Ano Base 2016/2035. São Paulo. Available: 
<http://www.sigrh.sp.gov.br/public/uploads/documents//CBH-AT/11958/relatorio-
i_plano_final-rev2.pdf>. 
Coelho, C.A.S., de Oliveira, C.P., Ambrizzi,T., et al., 2016. The 2014 southeast Brazil 
austral summer drought: regional scale mechanisms and teleconnections. Climate 
Dynamics 46 (11-12), 3737 – 3752. 
Cohen, D.A., 2016. The Rationed City: The Politics of Water, Housing, and Land Use 
in Drought-Parched São Paulo. Public Culture 28(2), 261 – 289. 
Cohen, A., Davidson, S., 2011. The watershed approach: challenges, antecedents, 
and the transition from technical tool to governance unit. Water Alternatives 4(1), 1-
14.  
	   24	  
Cooke, B., and Kothari, U., 2001. Participation: the new tyranny? Zed Books, 
London. 
Cortez, P.L., et al. 2015. Crise de abastecimento de água em São Paulo e falta de 
planejamento estratégico. Estudos Avançados 29 (84), 7-26. 
Cook, C., Bakker, K., 2012. Water security: Debating an emerging paradigm. Global 
Environmental Change 22(1), 94-102.  
Empinotti, V.L., 2010. Gênero, recursos Hídricos e Tomada de decisão: o Papel das 
Mulheres nos Organismos de Bacia Brasileiros. In: Abbers, R. N., (Ed.) Água e 
Política. Annablume, São Paulo, pp. 161 – 190. 
Empinotti, V. et al., 2014. The role of stakeholders in water management, In: 
Willaarts, B.A., Garrido, A., Llamas, M.R. (Eds.), Water for Food and Wellbeing in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Social and Environmental Implications for a 
Globalized Economy. Routledge, Oxon and New York, pp. 317-342. 
Fracalanza, A. P., Freire, T.M., 2015. Crise da água na região metropolitana de São 
Paulo: injustice ambinetal, privatização e mercatilização de um bem comum. 
GeoUSP 19(3), 464-478. 
Grey, D., Sadoff, C., 2007. Sink or swim?  Water security for growth and 
development. Water Policy 9, 545-571.  
Heller, L., Rezende, S., C., 2008. Saneamento no Brasil: políticas e interfaces. Ed. 
UFMG: Belo Horizonte. 
Heller, L., Rezende, S., C., Cairncross, S., 2014. Water and sanitation in Brazil: the 
public-private pendulum. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers: Municipal 
Engineer 167, 137-145. 
Hídricos, S. d. R. 2002. Política Nacional de Recursos Hídricos. 
http://www.mma.gov.br/port/conama/legiabre.cfm?codlegi=370 
Himley, M., 2008. Geographies of environmental governance: the nexus of nature 
and neoliberalism. Geography Compass 2(2), 433-451. 
Jacobi, P.R., Cibim, J., Leão, R., de Souza., 2015. Crise hídrica na Macrometrópole 
Paulista e respostas da sociedade civil. Estudos Avançados 29(84), 27-42. 
	   25	  
Jepson et al., 2017. Advancing human capabilities for water security: a relational 
approach. Water Security 1, 46-52. 
Kuss, A.H.P., 2017. Barriers to climate adaptation in urban areas: The case of water 
crisis in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo. Brasiliana – Journal for Brazilian 
Studies 5(2), 76-107.  
Lemos, M., C., Agrawal, A., 2006. Environmental governance. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources 31, 297-325.  
Lemos, M., C., and Oliveira, J., L., 2004. Can Water Reform Survive Politics? 
Institutional Change and River Basin Management in Ceará, Northeast Brazil. World 
Development 32 (12), 2121 - 2137. 
Linton, J., 2012. The human right to what? Water, rights, humans, and the relation of 
things. In: Sultana, F., Loftus, A. (Eds.) The Right to Water: Politics, Governance and 
Social Struggles. Earthscan, London, pp. 45-60. 
Linton, J., Budds, J., 2014. The hydrosocial cycle: Defining and mobilizing a 
relational-dialectical approach to water. Geoforum 57, 170-180.  
Loftus, A., 2015. Water (in) security: Securing the right to water. The Geographical 
Journal 181(4), 350-356.  
Martirani, L.A., Peres, I.K., 2016. Crise hídrica em São Paulo: Cobertura 
journalística, percepção pública, e o direito à informação. Ambiente e Sociedade 
XIX(1), 1-20.   
Momm-Schult, S. et al., 2015. The relation between water resources management 
and territorial planning in São Paulo macro metropolis (Brazil). Paper presented at 
the 51 ISOCARP Congress, Rotterdam, ND.  
Murtha, N.A., Castro, J.E., Heller, L., 2015. Uma perspectiva histórica das primeiras 
políticas públicas de saneamento e de recursos hídricos no Brasil. Ambiente e 
Sociedade XVIII(3), 193-210.   
Norman, E., S., Bakker, K., 2009. Transgressing scales: water governance across 
the Canada–US borderland. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99, 
99–117. 
	   26	  
Norman, E., Cook, C., Cohen, A. 2014. Negotiating Water Governance: Why the 
Politics of Scale Matter. Ashgate, Aldershot.  
Otto, F.E., et al., 2015. Explaining extreme events of 2014 from a climate 
perspective. Special supplement to the Bulletin of the American Meteorological 
Society 96(12), 35-40.  
Pahl-Wostl, C., Palmer, M., Richards, K., 2013. Enhancing water security for the 
benefits of humans and nature – the role of governance. Current Opinion in 
Environmental Sustainability 5, 636-684.   
Rocha, G., 2017. Maldição sobre São Paulo: Breve crônica sobre o Tietê 
metropolitan. Estudos Avançados 31 (89): 237-250. 
Swingedouw, E., 2005. Governance innovation and the citizen: the Janus face of 
governance-beyond-the –state. Urban Studies 42(1), 1-16. 
Swingedouw, E., 2009. The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a 
Democratic Politics of Environmental Production. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 33(3), 601-620. 
Swyngedouw, E., 2013. UN water report 2012: Depoliticizing water. Development 
and Change 44(3), 823-835.  
Tundisi, J.G., Tundisi, T.M., 2015. As múltiplas dimensões da crise hídrica. Revista 
USP 106, 21-30.  
Vandewalle, E., Jepson, W., 2015. Mediating water governance: point-of-use water 
filtration devices for low-income communities along the US-Mexico border. 
Geography and Environment 2(2),107-121. 
Warner, J., 2007. Multi-stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management. 
Ashgate, Farnham. 
	   27	  
 
Figure 1: São Paulo Metropolitan Region water system (Source: Momm-Schult et al. 
2015).  
 
 
Figure 2: Water access and distribution at SPMR: Institutional arrangements though 
time (own elaboration)  
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Figure 3: Interdependence between the Water Resources and Water Services 
governance systems (own elaboration)  
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